# COMPETITION AUTHORITY SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS AND SOCIAL WELFARE BY <br> Y. KATSOULACOS ET AL. 

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## Total welfare standard vs. consumer standard

$\square$ Competition policy...

- protects competition, not specific competitors
- no one side of transactions should have advantages ceteris paribus
- if there are some exemptions or indulgences than they should be based on the well-being of the whole society...
- ... especially as we do not know exactly who are consumers and where are their benefits
$\square$ But if we promote total welfare standard it does not necessarily mean that outcomes will follow our ideas...
- firms have their own expectations and responses


## Main findings

- Consumer surplus standard is generally more hostile towards potentially anticompetitive actions, and its use brings threats to total welfare
- an action may be prohibited or accepted under each set of standards - here is no difference
- sometimes, an action may be prohibited under CSS bur accepted under TWS; so, TWS is better
$\square$ But sometimes consumer surplus standard in antitrust will be better even in terms of total welfare
- if there are two different actions to choose between them
- both of them may be prohibited or accepted under both standards
- both of them may be prohibited under CSS but at least one accepted under TWS; so, TWS is better
- both of them accepted under TWS, only one - and more efficient but less profitable under CSS: here CSS is better
$\square$ Different levels of efficiency, monopoly power, price-raising effects affect the prevalence of CSS over TWS


## Questions

$\square$ If we switch between standards depending on conditions of specific markets (environments)...

- ... perhaps, costs of this switching will be too high (more analysis is needed)
- ... and it adds more legal uncertainty
$\square$ Does the outcome depend on the market structure and the model of interaction of companies?

