COMPETITION AUTHORITY SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS AND SOCIAL WELFARE BY Y. KATSOULACOS ET AL.

<u>Alexander Kurdin</u> <u>Moscow State University,</u> <u>Department of Economics</u> aakurdin@gmail.com

27.05.2014

MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY

Total welfare standard vs. consumer standard

- □ Competition policy...
 - protects competition, not specific competitors
 - no one side of transactions should have advantages ceteris paribus
 - if there are some exemptions or indulgences than they should be based on the well-being of the whole society...
 - ... especially as we do not know exactly who are consumers and where are their benefits
- But if we promote total welfare standard it does not necessarily mean that outcomes will follow our ideas...
 - firms have their own expectations and responses

Main findings

- Consumer surplus standard is generally more hostile towards potentially anticompetitive actions, and its use brings threats to total welfare
 - an action may be prohibited or accepted under each set of standards here is no difference
 - sometimes, an action may be prohibited under CSS bur accepted under TWS; so, TWS is better
- But sometimes consumer surplus standard in antitrust will be better even in terms of total welfare
 - if there are two different actions to choose between them
 - both of them may be prohibited or accepted under both standards
 - both of them may be prohibited under CSS but at least one accepted under TWS; so, TWS is better
 - both of them accepted under TWS, only one and more efficient but less profitable under CSS: here CSS is better
- Different levels of efficiency, monopoly power, price-raising effects affect the prevalence of CSS over TWS

Questions

- □ If we switch between standards depending on conditions of specific markets (environments)...
 - ... perhaps, costs of this switching will be too high (more analysis is needed)
 - ... and it adds more legal uncertainty
- Does the outcome depend on the market structure and the model of interaction of companies?